The conference shuffle : the Atlantic Coast Conference set off a wave of league swaps. Despite the outcry, it shouldn't have surprised anyone by Doug Campbell
I
n the fall of 2001 it was George
Nemhauser’s turn to serve as pres-
ident of the Atlantic Coast
Conference. Ordinarily this would be
no big deal. The position of ACC pres-
ident unceremoniously rotates each
year among league faculty representa-
tives. They tend to brand their terms
with lackluster pet projects like sports-
manship or raising academic standards.
But Nemhauser, a professor at
Georgia Tech’s industrial and systems
engineering department, had a gut
feeling that the nine-school ACC was
at a crossroads. So when ACC Com-
missioner John Swofford asked the
question — “What’s on your agenda?”
— Nemhauser didn’t hesitate: “We
need to think about expansion.”
And thus was set in motion the
events that led to a seismic shift in
athletic conference memberships
across the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA). By the fall of
2003, the ACC’s historic and some-
times tumultuous march to expansion
was complete. Ultimately accepting
invitations to join the ACC were three
schools: University of Miami, Virginia
Tech, and Boston College. The three
jumped from the Big East, setting off
a nationwide chain reaction of con-
ference swaps. In all, 19 schools
switched leagues during the second
half of 2003, and some analysts believe
more shuffling is to come. 
In the aftermath, ACC leaders were
giddy. “We have landed at a superb
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From Top to Bottom:
1) 2004 Atlantic Coast Conference Logo 
2) John Swofford, ACC Commissioner 
3) Miami vs. VA Tech, 12/4/04
4)Duke vs. UNC, 2/5/04
5) Jessica Trainor (Virginia) and 
Anne Morrell (North Carolina) at the 
2004 ACC Women’s Soccer Game
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press conference to announce the first
phase of expansion. In short order, the
ACC had enhanced its revenue-gener-
ating prowess in football while at the
same time preserving its reputation as
the premier men’s basketball confer-
ence. Television contracts were quickly
renegotiated to reflect the addition of
the Boston and Miami markets, Nos. 6
and 17, respectively in the nation, adding
millions of dollars to the ACC’s take.
This fall the ACC will hold its first-
ever football championship, worth an
estimated $7 million. And it stands a 
far stronger chance of placing two
schools in the coveted Bowl Champi-
onship Series (BCS), whose title game
is worth as much as $14 million and
lesser matchups not far behind.
Meanwhile, the Big East was in
crisis, reeling from what Commissioner
Mike Tranghese had called “the most
disastrous blow to intercollegiate ath-
letics in my lifetime.” In the space of
a few months the Big East became
the Medium East, having lost three of
its highest-profile schools. Suddenly,
it was scrambling to survive with only
six teams playing football.
The media portrayed the story in
multiple ways. Some said it was a case
of brilliant strategy by the ACC con-
trasted by the flat-footedness of the
Big East. Others saw it as an example
of greed overtaking amateur sports.
Neither turned out to be a fair 
characterization. Interviews with econ-
omists and NCAA observers suggest
that conference realignment was going
to  happen, whether or not the ACC
led the charge. Powerful market forces
were at work, creating incentives for
athletic leagues to grow membership.
What’s more, the Big East was
hardly asleep at the wheel. Big East
leaders in the late 1990s and in May
2003 approached the ACC about
merging their football leagues. On both
occasions it was the ACC that said ‘no,’
in the end deciding to cherry-pick some
of the Big East’s marquee schools
without having to take on the risks of
operating the proposed 18-team league.
In  hindsight, it all makes perfect
sense. The ACC’s and the Big East’s
actions are in keeping with microeco-
nomic models of how competitive
industries work.
“You can’t hold back these market
forces,” says Raymond Sauer, an econo-
mist at ACC member Clemson
University and keeper of the Web-log
www.sportseconomist.com.
Why It Happened
Pop quiz: The ACC is expanding from
nine member schools to 12 because:
a) Miami couldn’t fathom hosting a
home football game against lightweight
Big East foe Rutgers.
b) Newly struck television contracts
will bring the ACC an estimated extra
$16 million each year.
c) ACC leaders feared that Florida
State would leave if Miami was gobbled
up by the Southeast Conference (SEC).
Answer: All of the above.
At one time, all the ACC’s schools
called the Fifth District home. Estab-
lished in 1953 with eight schools, the
Greensboro-based ACC lost charter-
member University of South Carolina
in 1971 to the SEC but added Georgia
Tech in 1978 and Florida State in 1991.
In  Georgia Tech, the ACC laid claim
to the valuable Atlanta TV market; in
Florida State, it finally claimed a top-
tier football team.
The 1990s and beyond have been
good years to the ACC. Basketball
powerhouses Duke University, Univer-
sity of North Carolina, and University
of Maryland won championships,
earning the league a deserved distinc-
tion as the best in hoops. And Florida
State took home the No. 1 football
ranking for the 1999 season.
Nemhauser’s hunch — shared by
observers across the country — was that
time was running short for conferences
to  shore up membership and protect
their goodies. But if it were to go
through with enlargement, the ACC
would be making a huge bet. The league
annually pays out about $9 million to
$10 million each to its member schools,
according to tax filings. Adding three
more would mean having to come up
with an additional $30 million in annual
revenue to make sure incumbents
weren’t giving up anything.
The ACC hired sports-business con-
sultant Dean Bonham to conduct an
analysis of expansion’s pros and cons.
Bonham’s answer, contained in a report
that was a year in the making, was a
robust recommendation for adding
three schools. In Bonham’s analysis,
short-term monetary gains were sec-
ondary to the pressing task of durability.
“The bottom line came down not
to money but survival,” Bonham says.
“The ground underneath the collegiate
world was moving at a pretty rapid
rate. We foresaw there was going to
be a lot of alignment and realignment.
If  the ACC didn’t expand, some of
their competitors or other conferences
would.”
The collegiate map that Bonham
and ACC managers analyzed in 2002
laid bare the need for action. Out of
11 Division 1-A conferences, the ACC
ranked fifth in total revenue-per-school,
according to an NCAAstudy (see table
on page 22). On an average, per-school
basis, the league was losing money,
albeit just a bit. Additionally, the ACC
relied heavily on men’s basketball for
revenues, which would have been fine
except that football generally pays a lot
more. The bigger conferences, espe-
cially the SEC and the Big 12, gained
much more from their football pro-
grams. While the ACC took in an
average $8.1 million per school for
men’s basketball and $11.8 million for
football, the SEC generated $5.7 million
from men’s basketball and a whopping
$26.9 million from football.
Where does all that cash come
from? TVand radio revenues from con-
tracts negotiated by the schools
themselves account for 7 percent of
Division 1-A athletic program support.
Another 9 percent is from NCAA and
conference distributions. Most of that
money — an estimated 90 percent —
comes from broadcast agreements
negotiated by the NCAA and the ath-
letic conferences, such as the $6 billion,
11-year pact allowing CBS to broadcast
the NCAA basketball tournament. But
the bulk of collegiate athletic funds
derive from ticket sales — 26 percent.
Schools with 80,000- to 100,000-seat
football stadiums, packed seven times
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from ticket sales. Larger still
are alumni and booster contri-
butions at 18 percent and direct 
institutional support at 10
percent.
Tipping the scales in favor
of conference enlargement was
a relatively new post-season
feature of the NCAA — the
Bowl Championship Series.
The BCS was set up in 1998
for the purpose of declaring a
bona fide national champi-
onship in football. At the same
time, it preserved the tradi-
tional, and itself highly
profitable, bowl game system.
Six Division 1-A conferences
are guaranteed bids to the four
BCS games — the Orange,
Rose, Sugar, and Fiesta bowls
— with the top two ranked
teams in the country squaring
off for the so-called national
title. (A fifth BCS bowl game may be
added soon.) The ACC is one of those
with guaranteed bids. The payoff for a
national title entry is up to $14 million.
Even the lesser bowls are worth as much
as $11 million.
The conferences that get automatic
berths are known as BCS members,
and membership has its privileges.
Non-BCS conferences get a cut of the
bowl game spoils, but it amounts to
between $300,000 and $800,000, or
as little as $74,000 per school. By com-
parison, BCS conference schools take
in about $2 million each in bowl game
payouts. That means in any given year,
Wake  Forest University can expect a
big BCS payout even though it his-
torically hasn’t sent a single team to a
BCS game.
For the ACC, it was financially
imperative to keep a seat at the table
at the lucrative BCS. On average in
2002, conference schools were losing
money on their athletic programs.
That’s in part because athletic revenues
must be spread around to fund a typical
school’s less visible sports, ranging from
soccer to field hockey. But those at 
the top of the food chain — schools 
in the biggest conferences, all in the
BCS — were mostly making money.
Thus, the key to making money in
college athletics is strongly tied to con-
ference membership. With the
introduction of the BCS, schools had
a new incentive to consider changing
allegiances. 
Dan Fulks, an accounting profes-
sor at Transylvania University in
Kentucky and an NCAA consultant,
recalls a conversation with a BCS com-
missioner about the widening gap
between “have” and “have-not” con-
ferences. The commissioner replied,
“Look, don’t blame me. My job as com-
missioner is to make as much money
as I can for the schools in my confer-
ence, and that’s what I’m going to do.” 
Conference Rivalries Heat Up
To  be sure, conference realignments
are nothing new (see sidebar). The
reason they happen relatively infre-
quently has to do with the “industry”
structure. Think of athletic confer-
ences as rivals in an industry where the
schools are the suppliers and fans and
the TV broadcasters are the buyers.
The conferences are mainly differen-
tiated by their school membership.
They maximize their profits by pro-
moting stability, only seldom
reaching out to swipe each
other’s schools.
University of Chicago econ-
omist Allen Sanderson likens
collegiate athletic conferences
to  a cartel. When everybody
obeys the unwritten rules,
everybody profits. “But there’s
always the incentive to cheat,
whether it’s OPEC or the
NCAA,” Sanderson says.
The ACC wasn’t cheating,
but it was moved to take action
after observing several eyebrow-
raising developments. One risk
that several ACC managers
cited was that Miami —
crowned football National
Champion in 2001 — would
join the SEC if not courted by
the ACC. In their worst night-
mares, ACC officers saw Florida
State deciding to follow, thus
depleting the conference of its
foremost football draw. At the same
time, the opportunity to widen its TV
audience from New England down to
the southern tip of Florida was too
good to pass up. They wouldn’t even
have to change the conference’s
“Atlantic” name.
“It was our belief that a number of
changes would be coming anyway,”
ACC Commissioner Swofford says. “If
we were proactive, then we were in a
much better position to effect change
that would impact us positively rather
than having to react.”
Acquiring schools from the Big East
wasn’t the ACC’s only option, however.
After the BCS system was announced,
Big East leaders laid out their strate-
gic options. They realized that being
No. 6 in revenue in an 11-conference
system was a precarious position. 
In  1997 and 1999, the Big East
approached the ACC about joining the
two leagues’ football programs into a
single “federated football conference,”
according to parties familiar with the
talks. The thinking was that such a
coalition would upgrade the confer-
ences’ negotiating position with TV
networks. Together, the Big East and
the ACC would command an 18-team
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Conference Shuffle
Since the summer of 2003, 19 schools have announced changes
in conference affiliations. The ACC’s plucking of three Big East
schools got the ball rolling.
To  the ACC To the Big East





To  the Atlantic 10 South Florida
(both from C-USA)
UNC-Charlotte To Conference USA
Saint Louis Rice (from WAC)
Southern Methodist (from WAC)
To the WAC Tulsa (from WAC)
(all from Sun Belt) Marshall (from MAC)
New Mexico State Central Florida (from MAC)
Utah State Texas-El Paso (from WAC)
Idaho
SOURCE: NCAA; Conferences
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entire East Coast broadcast market.
But the ACC was cool to the idea
in the 1990s. And when Big East man-
agers pitched the idea anew in the
summer of 2003 in an effort to fend
off the ACC’s expansion, the answer
again was ‘no.’ Neither Swofford nor
Big East officials would comment
about the ACC-Big East merger talks.
Analysts interviewed for this story said
the ACC was probably turned off by
a merger for several reasons, including
an unwillingness to adopt separate
football and basketball memberships
and the logistical concerns of operat-
ing an unwieldy 18-school league.
“The Big East is a cobbled together
conference in the first place, and their
next move is trying to cobble the ACC
into their mix,” says Sauer, the
Clemson economist. “It makes good
strategic sense for them to do that but
they’re not really taking the ACC up
a peg with that proposal. It was [the
ACC’s] opportunity to choose
between alternatives and they clearly
chose one that made them better off.”
The ACC’s Competitive Advantage
How come the ACC was in position
to  make such a choice? A crucial
advantage the ACC held over the Big
East was organization. The ACC has
nine member schools that participate
in all sports and distribute conference
revenues equally. 
By contrast, the Big East, based in
Providence, R.I., created its basketball
and football programs separately. 
It kept nine schools for football pur-
poses only and 14 for basketball.
Georgetown University, for example,
participates in Big East basketball but
doesn’t field a Division 1-A football
team. West Virginia University, how-
ever, plays both. Conference revenues
were not handed out equally, and Big
East members didn’t give Commis-
sioner Tranghese the same leeway that
ACC schools did Swofford.
“The way it was structured, it
didn’t allow the commissioner to go
out and get things done,” Sauer says.
“It’s not that John Swofford was any
more capable than Tranghese up in the
Big East. It’s just that his organization
enabled Swofford to effectively move
in the direction that the economic
forces dictated the football conference
would move.”
If there’s a downside to expansion,
it’s the deterioration of some longtime
rivalries. Every fan wants Duke to
come to his school at least once a year
for hoops, but that’s no guarantee
under an expanded league. Swofford,
who played football at North Carolina
before rising to the league’s commis-
sioner office, says he understands the
importance of fan sentiments in the
ACC’s culture and revenue stream. At
the same time, “The feeling was that
the collective gain far outweighs the
things we would give up.”
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Conferences do collapse. Rewind to
1996 for the final incarnation of the
once-proud Southwest Conference
(SWC). An 82-year-old league, marquee
members included the University of
Texas, Texas A&M, and Baylor
University. Adorning member trophy
cases were seven national football cham-
pionships, five Heisman Trophies, and
two women’s basketball titles.
But talk about regional: After the
University of Arkansas left in 1992 for the
Southeastern Conference, all eight mem-
bers were from Texas. That was fine when
cross-state rivalries provided all the rev-
enue a conference needed to thrive, but it
was a huge liability at the dawn of the
1990s when national TV contracts
became the norm.
Texas is big, but it could deliver only 
7 percent of the nation’s TV markets.
Nearing its deathbed, the SWC talked
with the then-Big Eight about a merger.
Instead, four SWC schools — Texas,
Texas A&M, Texas Tech, and Baylor —
simply up and left for the soon-to-be
Big 12. The Western Athletic Conference
(WAC) swallowed three of the remaining
schools, Southern Methodist University,
Rice University, and Texas Christian
University, while the University of
Houston hopped to the newly founded
Conference USA.
The mid- and late-1990s, then, saw
nearly as much conference shuffling as 
in 2003, bolstering the NCAA’s assertion
that conferences have long been “adding
new members, casting off those that no
longer fit and changing their geographic
landscapes.” Witness the near-unraveling
of the WAC in 1999, when eight schools,
including four charter members, withdrew
to found the Mountain West Conference.
The WAC soon picked up Boise State
University and Louisiana Tech University,
giving it 11 members — until former SWC
member Texas Christian switched confer-
ences again, leaving for Conference USA
at the end of the 2000-2001 season.
Idaho, New Mexico State, and Utah State
have agreed to join the WAC in 2005. 
But, at the same time, the conference 
will lose Rice, Southern Methodist, the
University of Texas at El Paso, and the
University of Tulsa.
After all that, has the conference
shuffling reached its limit? “I believe that
conference realignment will occur when
it is economically feasible to do so,” says
Patrick Rishe, an economist at Webster
University in St. Louis. But even Rishe
believes it will be a while before more
conferences fold, expand, or otherwise
realign in significant fashion.
“I think that we’ve just about
stretched our limits.  Perhaps the Big 10
[which, despite its name, actually has 11
members since Penn State joined in 1993]
will add another team soon to reach the
magical number of ‘12’ that’s necessary
for a football championship. And per-
haps the Pac 10 will do the same soon,”
Rishe says. “When the Pac 10 does this, it
will cause a mini-domino effect as the
lesser West Coast conferences scramble
to try to replace teams that shift to other
conferences, but nothing like what we
recently saw.” —DOUG CAMPBELL
Conference Came Undone
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After some stumbles and lawsuits, 
in which at first only Miami and 
Virginia Tech were asked to join, the
ACC completed its growth spurt in
October 2003 when Boston College
signed up. With B.C. on board, the
ACC had achieved the magic number
12, qualifying under NCAA rules to 
hold a conference football champion-
ship game.
The collective gain was almost
instant. TV contracts were quickly
renegotiated, and even incumbent
ACC schools are to take in an esti-
mated $800,000 more annually under
newly inked deals with ABC and
ESPN. Also, new contracts were struck
with Charlotte-based Jefferson Pilot
Sports (JP Sports), which has top 
distribution and broadcast rights to
ACC basketball and regional rights to
ACC football. (JP Sports also has
rights to SEC regional football games.)
Jimmy Rayburn, vice president of 
operations with JP Sports, thinks the
loss of round-robin-style matchups 
in basketball will hurt but agrees 
with Swofford’s overarching view that
the conference improved itself.
“It’s not a perfect world. But did
they improve themselves? Yes. They did
in terms of financially improving them-
selves and in terms of having a seat at
the table in the future of any big foot-
ball talks, whether that’s playoffs or an
expanded BCS,” Rayburn says.
The Big East wasted little time
once all the ACC pieces fell into place.
By November 2003, it had picked up
five new schools to replace the three
departed. But in the process, the con-
ference pegged its future on basketball
and, according to some observers, may
lose its automatic bid to the eco-
nomically rewarding BCS. The five
new schools are Cincinnati, Louisville,
DePaul, Marquette, and the Univer-
sity of South Florida. Only the first
two of those schools have Division 1-
A football teams, and neither is a
perennial standout. When all the
league switching is done, the Big East
will have eight “full” members that
play both football and basketball and
another eight that play just basketball.
Strategically, it may have been the
Big East’s best, and only, option. “The
Big East, realizing its status in foot-
ball took a hit; they had to ask
themselves a question,” says Patrick
Rishe, an economist at Webster Uni-
versity in St. Louis. “Based on the
landscape in the short-term all we can
do is stay floating. So why not go
ahead and become the strongest bas-
ketball conference?”
John Marinatto, a Big East associ-
ate commissioner who was closely
involved in the expansion process, says
the new members accomplished the
conference’s goal of growing TV rev-
enues. He describes Cincinnati and
Louisville as significant broadcast
markets for football. Noting that the
past two basketball championships
have been won by member schools
Syracuse and Connecticut, he argues
that the Big East is now even more
so “the strongest basketball confer-
ence in the country.” As for the Big
East’s participation in the BCS, Mar-
inatto believes the league’s spot is
secure for “the foreseeable future.”
What’s Next?
The view from the ACC today is espe-
cially bright. The league placed six
teams in bowl games, but only mus-
tered one — new addition Virginia
Tech — in the BCS. ACC men’s bas-
ketball retains its pre-expansion cache,
with national broadcasts of pairings a
commonplace. Between the new tele-
vision contracts, the possibility of an
extra BCS game and a football cham-
pionship, the ACC already has topped
the necessary $120 million annually to
provide all its schools more money
than before expansion.
“I think the ACC is done (expand-
ing) for the time being, but it’s not
clear to me what the national scene
will look like,” says Prof. Nemhauser,
who started it all. 
Conference realignment is a game
with no clock. The BCS came under 
fire — again — this year for failing to
produce an undisputed national cham-
pion, as undefeated Auburn was left out
of the title game. Additionally, there was
evidence that the Big East’s recent depar-
tures have already weakened the
conference to the point where it should
no longer get an automatic BCS bid: Big
East champion University of Pittsburgh
went to the Fiesta Bowl despite its mid-
dling 8-3 record. Whether the BCS
expands or shrinks membership, whether
broadcasters recalibrate how much
they’re willing to pay for airing rights —
these will be the main factors in deter-
mining if the conference earthquake of
2003 has run out of aftershocks. RF
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R EADINGS
Athletic Conference Cash
In 2002 the ACC was the fifth-largest 
NCAA conference by revenues. 
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